Marco Estrada: Avoiding the Home Run

Jul 24, 2015; Seattle, WA, USA; Toronto Blue Jays pitcher

(25) throws against the Seattle Mariners during the fourth inning at Safeco Field. Mandatory Credit: Joe Nicholson-USA TODAY Sports

Many of his numbers are similar to last year, if not worse. His strikeout totals are actually down, notching a 6.81 K/9 while starting this year, compared to 7.74 last year. His walk rate is a very good 2.69 BB/9, improving his 2.94 mark from last year. Both of those changes shouldn’t have a dramatic difference on home runs.

His batted ball ratios as a starting pitcher are close to his career marks and those of 2014, with none of them pointing towards a massive improvement. His GB% rate of 31.3% is a career low, and his 49.8% FB rate is the highest it’s ever been. In the Rogers Centre, this seems like a recipe for disaster, especially for someone with home run issues.

His Pitchf/x data doesn’t show any glaring differences either. He’s getting hitters to swing at pitches inside the zone at a career high rate, and contact on those pitches is a career low. That’s a good sign, but a depressed strikeout rate suggests that’s not due to an increase in pure stuff, and isn’t pointing towards a home run reduction.

Two big things stand out when comparing his 2015 to 2014 and the rest of his career as a starting pitcher. His 2015 hard hit rate as a starter is a very solid 26.9%, right below arms such as Max Scherzer, Matt Harvey and Lance Lynn, and above arms such as Jacob deGrom, Johnny Cueto, Cole Hamels and Madison Bumgarner. Now, that obviously doesn’t tell the whole story, but that’s an elite group of pitchers to be around for an important statistic.

He’s surrendered hard hit rates of 36.1%, 36.4%, and 38.1% the last three years, so the 26.9% number is a huge improvement on what he’s done throughout his career. His BABIP is a career low .252 this year, but he’s always tended to put up low BABIP numbers; .253 in 2014, and .262 in 2013, so the effect of a decreased hard hit rate hasn’t been felt on his BABIP.

However, his HR/FB has dipped well below career norms, sitting at 6.3% (17.3% in 2014). This number seems to be directly correlated with his hard hit rate, and has been the driving factor in his success. His FB% rate of 49.8% puts him second among qualified pitchers, and without the low HR/FB, he’s not having the success he’s currently having.

Estrada’s velocity remains nearly identical to last season, with marginal changes here and there. However, his pitch usage does have a significant change. He’s reduced the use of his 4-seam by about 4%, cut out the sinker entirely, and slightly reduced the use of his change and curve. As a result, he’s mixed in a cutter consistently for the first time in his career. He’s mixed it in over 7% of the time, adding a reliable pitch to his arsenal that he hasn’t had in any year prior.

This is an important change, as it can have a number of different effects on a pitcher’s performance. He now has a pitch he can run in on the hands of a lefty and away from a righty, not so much acting as a swing and miss offering, but instead, using it as a mechanism to keep hitters off the 4-seam and as a way to miss hitter’s barrel, generating weak contact.

Introducing a new pitch also serves as another way to keep guys off balance, and Estrada himself explained this in an interview with Jeff Blair and Kevin Barker on Baseball Central, saying it was a good way to throw guys off and it’s been one of the keys to his success.

When watching him pitch, you can definitely see a guy who is constantly mixing his sequences and pitches well, and throwing all his pitches in different counts. For a guy who throws 90 mph, this is definitely important, and he’s passing the eye test in this regard. It’s tough to prove with numbers, but keeping guys off balance has a distinct effect on both hard hit rate and HR/FB.

Looking at the numbers side of the equation, the cutter hasn’t actually been a pitch that has had a lot of success on it’s own. He’s thrown the cutter 150 times, and while he hasn’t surrendered a home run with the pitch, opposing batters are hitting .375 against it, and slugging .542 against the offering. Not to say it hasn’t been effective, because it is when looking at sequencing and mixing pitches, but it’s definitely been hit hard.

The pitches making the true difference for Estrada have been his fourseam and his curve.

His change has always been his bread and butter. He gave up 10 home runs off the pitch in 2014, but he still kept batters to a strong AVG/SLG/ISO slash rate of .184/.350/.166. He’s managed to only surrender 2 home runs with the change this year, and the slash rate remains similar, yet improved, at .206/.306/.100.

With the fourseam, Estrada gave up 18 home runs and surrendered a .252/.498/.246 rate in 2014, acting as the biggest culprit of his home run issues. He’s dramatically improved that slash rate to .196/.378/.181 while giving up 9 home runs.

With the curve, he only gave up 1 home run in 2015, but hitters hit .395/.558/.163 off of it. This season, the curve has been essential for his success, giving up zero home runs with the pitch and surrendering a much improved .216/.243/.027 slash rate. That’s a dramatic change for both pitches.

According to Brooks Baseball, his curve has career high horizontal and vertical movement, showing the pitch has improved as it stands alone, but there is more to the success of the pitch than simply that.

Next: Part Three: Examining the pitch that has changed it all

Aug 4, 2015; Toronto, Ontario, CAN; Toronto Blue Jays pitcher Marco Estrada (25) knuckles with acting manager DeMarlo Hale (16) as he prepares to leave the game against Minnesota Twins in the seventh inning at Rogers Centre. Estrada was the winning pitcher in a 3-1 win for the Jays. Mandatory Credit: Dan Hamilton-USA TODAY Sports

Estrada’s fastball usage, location wise, has dramatically changed. It’s often preached by coaches, broadcasters, players themselves, etc., that it’s essential to get the ball down in the zone, and to locate your fastball in the lower regions of the strike zone in order to have success. But for Estrada, it’s been the very opposite.

Above are two zone profile charts acquired from Brooks Baseball. They both show Estrada’s fourseam fastball usage from the catcher’s perspective. The one on the left is from 2015, the one on the right from 2014.

As you can see, the 2015 chart shows a clear difference, Estrada has consistently used his fastball in the upper regions of the zone far more often this year, and he’s reduced his reliance on the bottom of the zone. And 2014 isn’t an anomaly; Estrada’s zone profile for his fastball in his effective years in 2012 and 2013 look far more like his 2014 chart than his 2015 one.

This isn’t a case of luck, where 2014 was unlucky and this season is lucky in regards to the home run ball. He’s clearly made an adjustment, whether it was directed so by the coaching staff, whoever is receiving him, or himself, it’s had terrific effects on his ability to induce weak contact. He’s learned how, at the age of 32, to use his 90 mph fastball effectively in the upper regions of the zone and above the zone. This usage is amplified with two strikes, as shown below.

These charts show fastball usage when Estrada has two strikes on opposing batters, with 2015 once again on the left. As you can see, his 2014 usage suggests he used the fastball up in the zone with two strikes, but would still mix it in other regions of the zone. In 2015, the fastball has almost exclusively been used in the top three rows of the chart.

Using his last start against the Yankees as an example, we saw him do this multiple times. He struckout Jacoby Ellsbury, Chase Headley, and Alex Rodriguez with high fastballs, and he got weak/lazy flyballs in these situations from a number of other players.

These two charts show the slugging percentages opposing hitters have had against Estrada’s fastball in the various zones. The 2015 chart on the left has generally less red/purple as is, but the top of the chart is where I place my focus. Outside of the zone where hitters are slugging .900 in the 2015 chart, he’s had pretty good success with the fastball in the upper three rows of the chart. He’s actually been hit hardest in the lowest portion of the strike zone, according to this chart.

The success of the fastball up in the zone has made the rest of his pitches better, and made his sequencing more diverse. A successful sequence relies on fastball location, without it, pitchers will have a difficult time mixing different pitches in a variety of counts. This is something we’ve seen with Hutchison this year, when his fastball location isn’t there, the success of his slider and change go down the drain. The success Estrada has had with his fastball, due to the adjustment he’s made in terms of location, has made him a entirely different, better pitcher.

In order to further examine the effectiveness of his fastball usage up in the zone to combat the home run, the next two charts show hitters ISO in different regions.

Isolated power is a statistic used to measure a hitter’s ability to hit for extra bases, so using it here when we’re examining Estrada’s ability to keep the ball in the yard is very important. As you can see in the 2015 chart on the left, the same three spots that are red in his slugging zone portfolio, are also red here. But outside of those three zones, he’s doing a good job avoiding the extra bases, especially in the upper regions of the chart.

What can we take away from all of this?

Clearly, he’s made an adjustment with his fastball, and the success is evident. For many pitchers, going up in the zone generally means they’re going for the strikeout, for Estrada, it means generating weak contact in the air. He doesn’t have the velocity to get a lot of swing and misses with the fastball, but if locates and sequences well with it up in the zone it can be effective and make the rest of his pitches stronger.

The heavy use of fastball high in the zone coincides with the career low GB% and career high FB%, which like I said, isn’t typically a recipe for success, but it has been for Estrada because he’s inducing weak contact.

The increase in weak contact has made the fourseam more successful this year, but the fact he’s attacking hitters in a way he never has before has opened the opportunity for his changeup and curve to become better offerings. By using his fastball to attack hitters up in the zone, he’s been able to sequence hitters in a variety of ways. In doing so, he’s set up hitters like he never has, this keeps hitters off balance, which generates weak contact more often with all pitches. It’s these type of adjustments that big league players need to make to stay effective for a long time.

I never watched him enough while he was with the Brewers to be able to pinpoint the problem causing his home run issues, but the addition of the cutter and the adjustment with the fastball usage are two things he never did in Milwaukee. In order to have a sky high HR/9 like he did in 2014 (2.27 HR/9 as a starter), he either made far too many mistake pitches without having the stuff to get away with it, or he fell into a pattern, making it easy for hitters to guess what’s coming.

The BB/9 is in the same ballpark, suggesting his control and command of pitches hasn’t changed to a high degree, and his stuff hasn’t gotten any better, but instead it’s these adjustments he’s made that have allowed him to limit home runs, and that has essentially saved the Blue Jays staff.

One may point to his xFIP of 4.67 as a starter and say this is simply a period of unsustainable luck. That xFIP of 4.67 is actually higher than his 2014 xFIP of 4.25, yet his repertoire is different, his tactical approach towards hitters is different, his sequencing is different, the type of contact he’s generating is much different. xFIP assumes the pitcher has a league average HR/FB mark; however, the 2014 Marco Estrada didn’t seemingly have a chance of lowering to that league average mark, while the 2015 Marco Estrada, due to the adjustments he’s made, has a distinct shot at staying below it.

Controlling the flyball, and controlling balls in play is a skill. Yes, there is obviously a portion of luck involved that will effect stats like HR/FB and BABIP in either direction, but assuming those marks will automatically get closer to league average is underselling a pitcher’s ability to control contact. The adjustments Estrada has made has allowed him to control the type of contact he gives up to a greater degree, and that’s why I look at his xFIP with a grain of salt.

I do believe some regression is in order however, but regression towards his FIP of 3.78 is more likely than the 4.67 xFIP.

Estrada has made the necessary adjustments needed in order to make him a viable big league starter. These adjustments allowed him to succeed, and arguably put the Blue Jays rotation in a position strong enough to go out and acquire the pieces they needed to make a legitimate playoff run. Tons of credit to Estrada, but also to those who found a way for him to be a better pitcher, and to the two men calling the game for him.