Ricky Romero didn't have his best stuff on Thursday. (David Richard-US PRESSWIRE)

Pitch tracking is an aspect of advanced scouting that every team uses in preparation for starting pitchers in an upcoming series. On Thursday’s broadcast, Buck Martinez mentioned how former Blue Jays catcher Kevin Cash was an offseason addition to the advanced scouting department and that he had been helping prepare the team for the Cleveland series.

The PitchFX system has taken away from pitch tracking a little bit, but there’s something to be said for having human eyes watching a pitcher as opposed to relying entirely upon a computer algorithm. Computers can’t think for themselves, which can cause problems on occasion, including an issue I encountered during today’s game, which I’ll touch on later.

The first step in my preparation was to use the PitchFX data from FanGraphs to get a better idea of the specific velocity and movement of Romero’s pitches. As a Blue Jays fan I know what kind of an arsenal he has, but I wanted to have some actual numbers on my page that I could reference throughout the start for pitch classification. The data (from the 2011 season) was as follows:

47.5% | Four-seam fastball | 92.0 mph
23.4% | Two-seam fastball | 91.5 mph
18.7% | Changeup | 84.9 mph
9.1% | Curveball | 77.1 mph
1.2% | Slider | 84.5 mph

As you can immediately see, he’s heavily reliant upon his two fastballs, totaling 70.9% of pitches thrown. Romero’s changeup and curveball -– both excellent offerings -– were also thrown with significant frequency. The slider, however, was seldom used. To further that point, Romero threw 0 sliders in Thursday’s start against Cleveland. Now that we have some background information, onto the game.

The first inning was arguably Romero’s best of the day, as he efficiently set the Indians down in order while throwing only 11 pitches (seven strikes). He worked almost exclusively with the fastball — 10 of the 11 pitches were heaters ranging between 90 and 92 mph. The 11th pitch, and last of the inning, was a 79 mph curveball that Indians right fielder Shin-Soo Choo pounded into the dirt in front of Romero for an easy groundout. (Disclaimer: I found it extremely difficult to differentiate between a left handed pitcher’s two-seam and four-seam fastballs (particularly with such a small velocity difference) from a center field camera, so outside of pitches I was able to be definitive with, I’ll refer to them simply as fastballs)

The second inning was a completely different story. Romero allowed two walks, two doubles and gave up a huge three-run home run to Jack Hannahan while throwing a staggering 43 pitches (23 strikes). That insane pitch count took an immediate toll on Romero’s arm, as after sitting 91-92 with the fastball in the first (and peaking as high as 94 mph on a four-seamer to Jason Kipnis in the second), the velocity fell to 88-90 mph in the latter half of the inning. The inning did see Romero throw his first changeups of the afternoon, as he tossed seven in the frame. Romero was effective with the pitch, as five of the seven changeups went for strikes and the other two fell safely down below the strike zone. His one miss was a hanging changeup to Shelley Duncan which went for a double to left field, and the curveball had a similar fate. Romero threw the breaking ball seven times in the inning, with the one mistake being the curveball that split the plate, thigh-high to Jack Hannahan. The other six went for three balls and three strikes, with the balls being inside or in the dirt and the three strikes resulting in a swinging strike, groundout, and strikeout.

The third inning was where PitchFX began to show some of its inadequacies. Romero’s fastball velocity continued to drop, plummeting as low as 86 mph on a 2-0 pitch to Carlos Santana, and touching 90 mph on only two of the 13 fastballs thrown in the inning. The 86 mph pitch was wrongly classified as a changeup, as its velocity was far more similar to Romero’s 84.9 mph average changeup velocity than to his two-seam fastball average velocity of 91.5 mph. The issue continued to occur with more frequency in the fourth and fifth innings. PitchFX does not account for excruciatingly long innings wearing an arm out, which once again is why human eyes will always be superior to computer algorithms in terms of scouting. When fastball velocity drops 4-5 mph in a start, you must adjust expected off-speed velocity accordingly. The curveball showed up only once this inning -– the ball in dirt tagout play that ended the third –- while also showing a drop in velocity at 75 mph. Two changeups were thrown, both bounced in the dirt for balls.

Romero faced only three batters in the fourth, throwing 13 pitches (nine strikes) in the bounce-back inning. He once again worked almost exclusively off the fastball, with 11 thrown between 85 and 89 mph. I counted five misclassified fastballs this inning, as Romero’s velocity drop continued to terrorize the PitchFX software. The two off-speed pitches he threw were very impressive, both coming in the at-bat against Casey Kotchman. The first was an 0-2 changeup in the dirt that the batter wisely held back on. The curveball was the very next offering, clipping the inner part of the plate on its way to Arencibia’s glove. The pitch was wrongfully declared a ball instead of strike three by the home plate umpire, but Romero managed to induce a ground ball to short only two pitches later to get the out.

In his fifth and final inning, Romero once again retired Cleveland in order. Learning from his earlier mistake, Romero fed Hannahan nothing but fastballs, with the plate appearance ending on a spectacular diving catch in center field by Colby Rasmus. Michael Brantley saw the only off-speed pitch of the inning, taking the 76 mph curveball in the dirt for a ball. He grounded out to second base on the next pitch. Asdrubal Cabrera was Romero’s last batter of the game, and he was punched out on four fastballs. Of the 13 pitches (9 strikes) thrown, 12 were fastballs, ranging between 85 and 90 mph.

I was really hoping to see Romero be at his best -– and throw more than five innings -– but today’s game was perhaps even more interesting for two reasons. Prior to this exercise, I had never really put too much thought into the classification scheme of the PitchFX system. I knew how it worked (the basics, at least), but I never considered how one agonizing inning that causes a temporary velocity drop could throw the system off so much. For me, this only further emphasizes the need to inspect data for outliers when using statistical sites like FanGraphs to make an argument. It was also interesting to closely examine a start in which the pitcher didn’t have his best stuff, and see how he adapted to the situation. Romero failed to establish first pitch strikes early on in the game, and it cost him in the long run. With far too much frequency he fell behind 1-0, immediately giving the hitter the advantage. Furthermore, the constant two and three-ball counts forced Romero to try and locate his off-speed pitches within the strike zone to avoid the walk. Romero is a much better pitcher when he’s able to establish the fastball early in the count and then work the changeup and curveball into 0-2 and 1-2 situations, where he can target swinging strikes or weak contact outside the strike zone. In Thursday’s game, after seeing his off-speed pitches get lit up in the second inning, Romero threw 85.7% fastballs (36/42) over the final three innings, recovering both his command and confidence.

For anyone interested in the general data from Romero’s start:

Total pitches: 96 (55 strikes, 41 balls)
Fastballs: 75 (78.1%) –- 45 strikes, 30 balls -– 85-94 mph, averaged 89.2 mph
Curveballs: 11 (11.5%) –- 5 strikes, 6 balls (5 in dirt) –- 75-80 mph, averaged 77.1 mph
Changeups: 10 (10.4%) –- 5 strikes, 5 balls (4 in dirt) –- 80-85 mph, averaged 82.0 mph
Sliders: 0 (0.0%) –- N/A
First pitch: 11 strikes, 10 balls –- (20 fastballs, 1 changeup)

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Kyle Drabek is looking to bounce back in 2012. (Daylife)

For Kyle Drabek, things have changed dramatically over the past 12 months. A year ago today, he was one of the favorites for the final two spots in the rotation behind Ricky Romero, Brandon Morrow, and Brett Cecil. He only further cemented his roster spot during Spring Training, where he put together a 2.81 ERA, 1.19 WHIP, and a 14:1 strikeout to walk ratio in his 16 innings (four starts). Preseason prognostication had him pegged as one of the three top choices for American League Rookie of the Year, alongside pitchers Jeremy Hellickson of the Rays and Michael Pineda of the Mariners. One of the three put together a 2.95 ERA on his way to winning the aforementioned award. Another made the All-Star team. The third didn’t share the same success and compiled a 6.74 ERA across 29 starts between the Majors and Triple-A. I’m sure Blue Jays fans are well aware which of the three Drabek was.

How exactly does a team’s best pitching prospect – and one of the best pitchers in the entire minor leagues – completely implode in only a matter of months? This wasn’t simply rookie struggles. As Blue Jays fans saw in the first half of the season, this was a complete physical and mental breakdown. Before we can figure out what Drabek needs to do to avoid a similar fate in the upcoming season, we must first determine what exactly went wrong last season.

35.5% four-seam fastballs, 93.4 mph
29.4% two-seam fastballs, 93.1 mph
16.1% cut fastball, 91.2 mph
7.6% “slider”, 82.3 mph
6.9% changeup, 86.5 mph
4.4% curveball, 83.0 mph

The information above is the percentage of total pitches and average velocity of each of Drabek’s “six” pitches from his time in the Majors in 2011, via FanGraphs. I put both the terms “slider” and “six” in quotations, because in actuality, Kyle Drabek does not throw a slider. He throws three different types of fastballs – the traditional four-seamer, a two-seamer, and a cut fastball – as well as a power curveball and straight changeup. The “slider” that appears in his PitchFX data is really a mislabeled curveball, though to be fair, outside of velocity, it’s really nothing like his true spike curveball.

As you can see in the data from his start against the Minnesota Twins on April 2 – arguably his best start of the season – the only offspeed pitch he threw was the aforementioned power curveball. The curve sat between 80 and 86 mph, and had movement that agrees with the 1-7 arc he puts on the pitch. His best curveball of the evening had an incredible 12 inches of vertical break. Additionally, curveballs accounted for 16 of his 101 total pitches thrown, good for 15.8%.

It was a far different story in his start against the Boston Red Sox on June 12, his final start with Toronto before his demotion to Triple-A. In this game, he threw zero pitches that were classified as curveballs, and seven pitches that were classified as “sliders”. The pitches clocked between 81 and 86 mph, but had far different movement than the breaking ball that we saw in his dominant April debut. The best of these “sliders” had six inches of vertical drop, merely half of the break his spike curveball typically shows. He threw 91 pitches in the game, and with only seven breaking balls (7.7%), he clearly became overly reliant on his three fastballs and his changeup. Comparing these two starts is like comparing apples and oranges, because outside of the name on the back of the jersey, Drabek was not the same pitcher in June as he was in April.

So how exactly does a curveball get misclassified as a slider? The PitchFX system relies upon velocity and movement for their classification scheme, and as the year wore on, the action on Drabek’s curveball left the range of parameters predetermined for the pitch. As the breaking ball exits said range, the system is forced to reclassify it to the pitch type with the most commonalities in velocity and movement – in this case, a slider. With that being said, Blue Jays fans are likely far more interested in knowing what happened to Drabek’s curveball, the plus-plus pitch that made him the top prospect that he was.
In reality, the grips between the two pitches aren’t drastically different; it’s the arm slot that has the biggest effect. Pitchers who rely upon curveballs will usually work from an overhead arm slot. Such an arm slot allows the pitcher to get a steep downward plane on the ball, creating beautiful 12-to-6 action. Former Cy Young Award winner Adam Wainwright is a perfect example of this. In contrast, pitchers who rely upon sliders will typically work from more of a three-quarter arm slot. It allows them to get two-plane movement and tilt on the pitch, as Blue Jays fans saw when Dave Stieb regularly took the mound in Toronto.

The arm slot is particularly important for Drabek, since at 6-foot-1, he needs to have as high of a release point as possible to create a downward plane. As the season wore on, however, something happened that caused his arm slot to drop. Whether it was fatigue, injury, or simply mechanical flaws we may never know, but the lowered arm slot killed the vertical movement on his breaking ball, transforming it from a power curveball into a slurve. With the breaking ball lacking its usual sharp movement, Drabek began to shy away from it, throwing more and more fastballs and cutters in its place. His fastball command is mediocre at best, so as hitters realized they didn’t have to worry about the curveball, they simply stood at the plate and let Drabek work himself into hitters counts. The problem only worsened from there, as Drabek becomes increasingly reliant upon fastballs in these situations.

1-0: 67% FB | 2-1: 74% FB | 2-0: 85% FB | 3-1: 95% FB | 3-0: 100% FB

When a pitcher becomes dependent upon fastballs and, thanks to his command, is always in fastball counts, you have a problem. Hitters know what’s coming, and as we saw, the results aren’t pretty.

Beyond just the mechanical issues that worsened as the year wore on, one has to wonder how much of an effect being the only pitching prospect in the Roy Halladay trade had on Kyle Drabek. His fiery personality is well documented, so it’s not out of the realm of possibility that both expectations and his ineffectiveness took an emotional toll, particularly as the failure began to compound itself. Through my personal observations, and I’m confident most would agree, Drabek looked like a defeated man in late May and early June prior to his demotion. In a recent article written by Steve Kornacki of the Globe and Mail, Drabek was quoted as saying “I was frustrated every inning, every game. And it did not help me; it hurt me.” He stepped onto the mound with no confidence, expecting failure. When a player has that mindset, failure really becomes the only option, as it’s near impossible to succeed at anything in life – let alone the competitive environment of professional sports – if you don’t believe in yourself.

The great part about Spring Training is that it’s a fresh start for everyone. Fixing his mechanics and becoming more consistent with his release point appears to have been the focus of Drabek’s offseason, as he has entered the spring focused on drills that will clean up his delivery. With more consistent and sound mechanics, the sharp break on his curveball should return. Not only will the breaking ball itself be much improved, but by throwing it more – perhaps 15-20% – he’ll keep hitters off balance, and his other pitches will see improvement as well. Working backwards and throwing the curveball in fastball counts would also be of great benefit to him, because as I mentioned, he’s become far too predictable in that regard.

Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, Drabek is entering Spring Training 2012 under the radar. He’s more than two years removed from the Roy Halladay trade, and he’s no longer the top pitching prospect that is expected to immediately help lead the staff and contend for the American League Rookie of the Year award. He’s now just one of the guys, looking to perform well enough to contend for the fifth spot in the rotation. After such a disastrous 2011 season, expectations really couldn’t be lower, and that’s exactly what Drabek needs right now. Finding consistency with his mechanics and rebuilding his confidence aren’t going to happen overnight, and with the wealth of pitching talent Toronto now possesses, there’s no immediate pressure. Whether it’s as the fifth starter in Toronto or down in Double-A New Hampshire, Drabek will sort himself out, and when he does, he’ll be worth the wait.

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